The FooKey METHOD
The ‘Common Flaws‘ in ALL encryption technologies to date are :
- Typing on a KeyBoard to enter the password
- Clicking on the Mouse / Pointer device that controls the location of the cursor
- Some person or device looking / recording your screen as you type the password
- The human developing a password that is easily guessed, or can be brute forced due to its length
- Sharing the password with a third party to decrypt the data
- Storing the encrypted data in a secure location so no unauthorized access can be made to either the key(s) to decrypt the data or the encrypted data itself
FooCrypt, A Tale Of Cynical Cyclical Encryption, takes away the above ‘Common Flaws‘ by providing you with software engineered to alleviate them.
1,2,3 are mitigated by the FooKeyBoard, Auto Key Press ( AK / FAK ) and a simple combination of colors modifying the Cypher Key Control Text Window. The TopeSecretCypherKeyControlText Preference Setting enables you to have a such a configuration. All the Text is hidden until you click and drag the cursor over a text area revealing only the portion of the text window you choose. You can even create a FooKey, without knowing the original characters that you are replacing by using the XY features ( XY ), or by revealing any of the characters contained within the FooKey.
4 is mitigated by the simple configurability of FooCrypt, to accept random data from an unlimited number of sources and following FooCrypt’s DEFAULT settings of utilising a length up to the maximum
5 is mitigated by FooCrypt’s ability to import any binary data as a source for creating a FooKey, hence sharing the FooKey, can be obfuscated by an act as simple as sending the third party :
A Music file
A URL to a data source on the Internet / Intranet
The possibilities are endless
Then, all the third party has to do, is utilise FooCrypt’s Import Window Memory Binary Features, to recreate the FooKey.
Modifications to the imported binary import can be made with ease with FooCrypt’s XY features, enabling identical cursor positioning for character modifications to the binary import
5 and 6 can also be mitigated by using FooSteg to obfuscate the sharing / storing of a FooKey, by embedding the FooKey, inside an image.
6 can be mitigated by always storing your encrypted data on an encrypted media device, thus even if your media device is physically stolen, the thief needs to break the disk encryption, and then try to break FooCrypt’s Cyclical Encryption. FooKey’s are always stored on physical media, encrypted in a single layer of encryption. FooKey’s can easily be encrypted by the User with a FooKey, hence, layering the FooKey in multiple layers of encryption.
In the above images, FooCrypt is running from the Disk Image and has been configured to utilise an external media device /Volumes/FooCrypt as well as /Volumes/FooCryptMemory which is an encrypted volume, created out of a portion of the available memory.Encrypted RAM Volumes are currently under going extensive testing for integration into
FooCrypt, A Tale Of Cynical Cyclical Encryption
and scheduled for the
DARWIN release 4th Quarter, 2020.
Ubuntu 16.04, Hardware, VM, Cloud, Live ISO or USB
Binary Compatible Linux, Hardware, VM, Cloud
( If FooCrypt isn’t compiled for it, ask and it will be )
All Linux Options Are Licensed to a Licensing Dongle
Example : FooCrypt.X.Y.Z.Core.Live.Linux ISO in a VMware Virtual Machine